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IN MEMORIAM

W ILLIAM L. CARY
November 27, 1910 - February 7, 1983

The Members of the

PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
of the SEC Practice Section-AICPA
Present this Symbol of Appreciation
of

WILLIAM L. CARY

Whereas, in 1977, the Public Oversight Board was appointed to monitor and evaluate the activities of an
enhanced program of self-regulation of the accounting profession through the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, and
Whereas, for more than four years, your talent, vision and fine judgment have benefitted the accounting
profession, the SEC Practice Section of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and most par
ticularly, the Public Oversight Board, and
Whereas, you played an instrumental role in formulating the Board’s jurisdiction and operating policies
and in formulating the Board’s thoughts relative to the accounting profession’s self-regulating program, and
Whereas, your sound reasoning, judgment and legal scholarship, as well as your wide experience, includ
ing that of former chairmanship of the Securities and Exchange Commission, were relied upon heavily by the
Board in its decision-making process, and
Whereas, your ideas were invariably imaginative and provocative and it is with sincere regret that the
Board accepts your decision to resign. Now, therefore, be it
Resolved: That the members of the Public Oversight Board individually and collectively express to you
their deep appreciation for the efforts you expended in behalf of the Board’s progress. Your service has earned
you the admiration and affection of all your fellow Board members. Your contribution to the profession and to
the Board will have continuing effect
John J. McCloy
October 19, 1982
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June 3 0 , 1983

To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section,
Securities and Exchange Commission and
Other Interested Parties

It is my pleasure to transmit this fifth annual report of the Public Oversight Board. The fifth
anniversary of the commencement of the accounting profession’s self-regulatory program
seems an appropriate time to present the Board’s assessment of the program’s accom
plishments to date and identify some challenges that may lie ahead. Accordingly, this report
summarizes not only the activities of the SEC Practice Section for the year ended June 30,
1983, but also the major events of the first five years of the program.
The past five years have constituted a learning experience for all who have been actively
involved in the program. Among other things, we have gained an increased awareness of the
sharp differences between governmental regulation and self-regulation. The accompanying
report seeks to identify these differences and to comment on the proper objectives for the
section’s self-regulatory program.
The Board believes that the accounting profession deserves credit for the effective program
which it now has in place. It will, of course, require constant refinement and attention to
maintain and improve its quality and effectiveness.

Very truly yours,

John J. McCloy
Chairman
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The SEC Practice Section and the Private Companies Practice Section constitute the
Division for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The divi
sion was created in the fall of 1977 in response to a perceived need for a more effective selfregulatory program for the accounting profession. The Public Oversight Board was formed in
1978 to oversee the activities of the SEC Practice Section.
A t the invitation of the Council of the Institute, John J. McCloy, Chairman of the
Board, reported informally at the Council meeting on May 9 , 1983 in Phoenix, Arizona, on the
first five years of progress of the SEC section. The text of his address is set forth in Exhibit I.
This fifth annual report of the Public Oversight Board describes the activities of the
SEC section during the period July 1 , 1982 to June 3 0 , 1983 and supplements Mr. McCloy’s
report by summarizing the section’s accomplishments during its first five years.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAM
The Role of the Board
The past five years have been a learning experience for all who have been actively
involved in the operation of the self-regulatory program—an interesting, exciting and, at times,
difficult but nevertheless productive experience. Three persons have served as Board members
throughout this period—John J. McCloy as chairman, and Arthur M. Wood and John D. Har
per as members. Mr. Wood currently serves as vice-chairman. The Board benefitted greatly
from the contributions of two former SEC chairmen—Ray Garrett, Jr. and William L. Cary—
who were charter members of the Board. Mr. Garrett died in 1980 while a member and Mr. Cary
died in 1982 shortly after resigning because of illness. Robert K. Mautz, the first accountant to
be appointed a member, joined the Board in 1981, and A. A. Sommer, Jr., a former SEC com
missioner, was appointed in 1983. The current composition of the Board and its staff are shown
in Exhibit II. Estimated expenses of the Board for the year ended July 31, 1983 are shown in
Exhibit III.
The Board’s primary function is to monitor and comment on the section’s activities.
From the beginning, the Board has taken the position that if the self-regulatory program is to be
successful, all authority must be vested in the profession itself. The Board does not have line
authority and desires none.
The Board discharges its responsibilities by meeting regularly with officials and com
mittees responsible for the various components of the program, observing and reviewing the
results of the peer review and special investigative processes, and periodically conferring with
the commissioners and staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC, charged by
Congress with overseeing the practice of accountants before the commission, interacts with the
accounting profession’s self-regulatory program. The profession’s self-regulatory program
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supplements and complements the SEC’s oversight program and must be viewed in concert with
the other regulatory mechanisms in our society. The first five years of the program provided
numerous opportunities for the section and the SEC to work together to coordinate their efforts
and make their respective programs more efficient. As a result of the experience gained, both the
section and the SEC have a clearer understanding today of what the program can reasonably be
expected to accomplish.
The SEC has actively monitored and encouraged the self-regulatory program of the
accounting profession. As indicated in its 1982 report to Congress (SEC Report), the SEC is
placing increased reliance on the profession’s program.1 An excerpt of its 1982 report is set forth
in Exhibit IV.

Differences Between Self-Regulation and Government Regulation
Perhaps the most valuable experience gained during the initial period has been a
recognition that self-regulation is not a substitute for governmental regulation. The methods and
objectives of a self-regulatory program are markedly different from those of a governmental
regulatory agency. Recently, these differences were articulated by Board member Robert K.
Mautz, whose article on the subject appeared in the Journal o f Accountancy for May 1983 and
is reproduced as Exhibit V.
Many persons, including some members of the profession and some governmental
officials, equate self-regulation with governmental regulation or perceive self-regulation as a
substitute for governmental regulation. Dr. Mautz points out that there is a general misun
derstanding of what self-regulation entails and that such misunderstanding may be a significant
impediment to the program in achieving the credibility it deserves. The effectiveness of a selfregulatory program should be measured by the merit of its objectives and the extent to which it
achieves them, not by the extent to which it emulates governmental regulation. Governmental
regulation emphasizes the deterrent effects of punishment and sanctions in dealing with inade
quate performance. The accounting profession’s self-regulatory program, particularly through
the preventative measures of its peer review and special investigative processes, emphasizes
corrective action to minimize the recurrence of inadequate performance and uses sanctions only
to compel the undertaking of corrective action deemed necessary to protect the public interest
Some critics of self-regulation question its effectiveness and are likely to continue to do so as
long as they expect it to emulate the governmental regulatory model. The profession should dis
abuse these critics of their unrealistic expectations.

M ajor Committees of the Section
The important work of the section is administered through its three major committees,
the executive committee, peer review committee, and special investigations committee, whose
membership is set forth in Exhibit VI.

1 Securities and Exchange Commission, Annual Report, 1982, U.S. Government Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.
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PEER REVIEW PROCESS
History of Peer Reviews
The peer review process is the foundation of the section’s self-regulatory program.
Through this process, the section determines whether member firms have, and are complying
with, an appropriate quality control system in the performance of accounting and auditing
engagements in a manner that gives reasonable assurance that professional standards are being
m et By subjecting their accounting and auditing practices to peer review, member firms
demonstrate their dedication to achieving and maintaining high quality professional practices.
In the relatively short period of five years since its inception, the section has developed
an impressive peer review process and over four hundred SEC section firms have undergone one
or two peer reviews.
The Board and its staff closely monitor the peer review process and believe that its
emphasis on improving the quality control systems of members has produced results that are in
the public’s and the profession’s best interests. Every peer review includes an examination of a
reasonable cross-section of the reviewed firm’s accounting and auditing engagements and, in
multioffice firms, a representative number of practice offices. Peer review has assisted member
firms in improving the quality of their accounting and auditing practices, thereby reducing the
possibility of future audit failure. It must be noted, however, that peer reviewers examine only a
sample of the firm’s engagements and thus an unqualified peer review report is not to be con
strued as a guarantee that the firm has performed all engagements, and will perform all future
engagements, in accordance with professional standards.
The SEC recognizes the positive impact that the peer review process has on the quality
of audit practice. The SEC Report2 comments on the efficacy of peer review as follows: “ If and
when audit failures occur, the commission expects they will be due to isolated breakdowns or
‘people problems,’ and not to inherent deficiencies in firms’ systems of quality control.”

Improvements in Quality of Practice by M ember Firm s
Most firms are determined by peer reviewers to have effective systems of quality con
trol. However, many reviewers identify areas where improvements are suggested and, in some
cases, required. In those circumstances, in addition to the report on the peer review, the reviewer
issues a letter of comments identifying areas that could be strengthened. The peer review com
mittee reviews all reports, letters of comments, and the related corrective action plans filed by
reviewed firms, and it evaluates each firm’s corrective action plan to eliminate weaknesses in its
controls or to assure greater compliance with its policies and procedures. The committee
requires candor in reporting and aggressively pursues engagements deemed not to have been
performed in accordance with professional standards. After the committee concludes that the
review was performed and reported on in accordance with the section’s standards and that
appropriate actions are being taken by the firm, it places all these documents in a file available to
the public on request. A summary of the types of reports issued during the first five years of the
program is shown in Table 1.

2Securities and Exchange Commission, op. cit.
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TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF TYPES OF PEER REVIEW REPORTS
ISSUED DURING FIRST FIVE YEARS OF THE PROGRAM

Total

1982

Review Year
1980
1981

1979

1978

Firms receiving unqualified report
without letter of comments

34

5

16

9

2

2

Firms receiving unqualified report
and letter of comments

360

63

152

109

28

8

Firms receiving modified report*

63

3

27

24

8

1

Firms receiving adverse report*

13

8

3

2

203

145

40

—

71

470

—

11

• Thirty-five reports were adverse or modified for more than one reason. The reasons cited were:
Inadequate documentation or noncompliance in a desig
nated area of quality control:
43
Supervision
41
Inspection
4
Consultation
4
Independence
4
Advancement
Assignment of Personnel
1
97
Noncompliance with other membership requirements:
14
Concurring partner review
9
Continuing professional education
6
Liability insurance
Other
__ 2
31

Additional Requirements Imposed by Committee
The committee has the authority to recommend that the executive committee impose a
sanction if a firm’s quality control system cannot be relied on and the firm refuses to make the
corrections deemed necessary. Although the committee has not as yet exercised this authority, it
has required some firms to comply with rather severe additional requirements when their quality
control systems were deemed to be materially deficient. Since these requirements were volun
tarily agreed to by the firms, they have not been classified as sanctions, even though they
achieved the same objective.
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To date, the committee has required thirty firms to permit a revisit by the peer reviewer
or an alternate to determine whether the firm had taken appropriate corrective action. Twentytwo firms agreed, as a condition of continued membership, to undergo an accelerated full scope
peer review, i.e., a review in the next year or two rather than in the third year. To date, ten of the
firms that previously received highly modified or adverse reports have had their revised quality
control systems subjected to peer review. These subsequent reviews ascertained that each of
these firms improved its practice substantially, eight to such an extent that they received
unqualified reports. Twelve firms were allowed sufficient time to implement corrective action
and accordingly their reviews are scheduled for the latter half of 1983. Two firms withdrew
rather than undergo an accelerated review. In all these situations, correspondence between the
committee and reviewed firms detailing these additional requirements is placed in the public file.
Table 2 provides additional information.

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS
TO ASSURE QUALITY CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS
IN CONNECTION WITH PEER REVIEWS
DURING THE FIVE YEARS ENDED JUNE 30, 1983
Type of Report/Action
of the Committee
Firms receiving adverse report
Accelerated peer review
Revisit by peer reviewer
Firms receiving modified report
Accelerated peer review
Revisit by peer reviewer

Total

1982

Review Year
1981
1980

1979

1978

12

1
13
9

Firms receiving unqualified report
and letter of comments
Revisit by peer reviewer
Total reviews where corrective
actions were required as a condi
tion of continued membership

22

41

13

The SEC Report commented on the committee’s practice of imposing additional
requirements as follows:
“ The commission concurs in the POB’s belief that this
informal process gives the SECPS the ability to act promptly
and achieves the same result as the imposition of a sanction.
The formal sanction process remains available and should be
used when m andatory corrective m easures are not under
taken promptly or where a member chooses not to cooperate.”
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Substandard Performance on Individual Engagements
While the thrust of peer review is to identify and correct defi ciencies in a firm’s system
of quality control, the process also deals with instances of substandard auditing or accounting
performance on individual engagements, which are required to be reported promptly to the com
mittee. During 1981 and 1982, peer reviewers reviewed the financial statements, reports, and
workpapers for more than nineteen hundred audit engagements. Sixty-one of these engage
ments were deemed to be substandard in the application of generally accepted accounting prin
ciples (GAAP) or generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). In approximately thirty-six
percent of the cases in which the financial statements were not in accordance with GAAP, the
reviewed firm immediately recalled its report, and the financial statements were reissued. The
remaining cases generally involved reports given limited distribution and did not require
immediate recall; however, the firms agreed to cause the deficiencies to be corrected in the sub
sequent year’s report
In each instance where the peer reviewers concluded that the audit had not been per
formed in accordance with GAAS, the firm either immediately performed the omitted pro
cedures or agreed to perform the procedures in a subsequent imminent audit Table 3 summarizes
the actions taken by the firms in connection with engagements found not to have been performed
in accordance with professional standards.

TABLE3

SUBSTANDARD AUDIT ENGAGEMENTS
IN PEER REVIEWS PERFORMED IN 1982 AND 1981
Total

1982

1981

14

4

10

Omitted auditing procedures performed

7

4

3

Cause of impairment of independence eliminated

3

-

3

GAAP and GAAS deficiencies not requiring im
mediate action to be corrected in subsequent year’s
audit

37

6

31

Number of audit engagements considered sub
standard by peer reviewer

61

14

47

Number of audit engagements reviewed

1,919

584

1,335

Percent

3.2%

2.4%

3.5%

Corrective Action Required by Committee
Audit report recalled and financial statements revised
and reissued
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Modification of Peer Review Standards and Procedures
The peer review process is being modified as experience is gained. The committee
recently revised its manual and updated its codification of standards for performing and
reporting on peer reviews.This codification incorporates many of the suggestions made by the
POB staff and the SEC staff. For example, beginning with 1983 reviews, reviewers are given
more specific guidance in selecting for review a representative sample of audit work performed
by other offices under the supervision of the office primarily responsible for the overall engage
ment. If a firm has multioffice engagements, the reviewer must now review for at least one such
engagement the workpapers prepared by the primary office and at least one other office perform
ing a significant segment of that engagement
New procedures were adopted to further expedite completion of peer reviews. As pre
viously reported, during the initial years of the peer review process, many reviews were com
pleted much later than planned. Each member firm is now required to submit to the peer review
committee its peer review report, letter of comments and response no later than thirty days after
issuance of the report and letter of comments. Failure to do so could lead to the imposition of a
sanction. In addition, a reviewer failing to complete and report on a review in a timely, pro
fessional manner could be subject to disciplinary action. Review procedures also require
reviewers to consult immediately with the committee when instances of materially substandard
performance are identified, thereby expediting committee involvement and facilitating timely
resolution of such matters. Vigorous enforcement of these procedures will improve the pace of
processing reports and the timeliness of corrective action.
Experience has permitted other efficiencies in the process to be adopted. For example,
standards now permit a reviewer, who after appropriate testing concludes that he can rely on the
reviewed firm’s inspection program, to use inspection findings along with peer review findings as
a basis for his report By so doing, the reviewer reduces the number of offices and the number of
engagements he personally reviews, thus substantially reducing the cost of peer review.

Elimination of the Quality Control Review Panel
A peer review can be conducted by a team appointed by the section’s peer review com
mittee, by a team or firm appointed by an association whose plan for administering reviews has
been approved by the peer review committee, or by another member firm selected by the firm to
be reviewed.
Prior to 1982, at the insistence of the SEC, a panel was assigned to each peer review
conducted by another firm or administered by an association of CPA firms. The panel’s respon
sibility was to issue an independent opinion on the quality control system of the reviewed firm.
The procedures and the report of the panel, in essence,duplicated those of the primary reviewer.
Based on a study conducted by the Board’s staff to evaluate the cost effectiveness of the panel,
the Board recommended that the panel be eliminated. The section accepted and implemented
the Board’s recommendation and the SEC did not object.
The Board is confident that elimination of the panel has not impaired the effectiveness
of the process. As a transitional procedure, members of the committee performed preissuance
reviews on a sample of 1982 firm-on-firm and association reviews. Evaluation of the results of
the transitional procedure indicated that preissuance review procedures were unnecessary.
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primarily because they were duplicative of oversight procedures conducted by the Board’s staff.
Consequently, beginning with 1983 reviews, the committee performs preissuance review pro
cedures only on a case-by-case basis upon recommendations of its chairman or staff. The Board
concurs with this decision.

Oversight of the Process
Because of the importance of peer review in the overall self-regulatory program, the
Board and its staff devote a significant amount of time to monitoring all aspects of the process.
The staff attends all meetings of the committee and, at its discretion, attends most meetings of
the committee’s subcommittees and task forces. The Board’s views are generally sought on all
proposed changes in the peer review process and its comments on individual peer reviews are
considered by the committee in deciding whether the review was performed in accordance with
prescribed standards.
As in each of the preceding years, during 1982-83 the Board continued its policy of mon
itoring all reviews. It observed reviews in process on all firms with five or more SEC clients and,
on a random sample basis, a number of other firms with fewer than five SEC clients and a rep
resentative number of firms with no SEC clients. Details are shown in Table 4.

TA BLE 4

SCOPE OF BOARD OVERSIGHT
OF 1982 PEER REVIEWS
Number of Firms by
Number of SEC Clients
30 or
more
Visitation and workpaper review

5 to
29

1 to
4

3

14

9

30

8

24

32

12

12

45

74

4

Workpaper review

-

-

Report review
Total

4

3

22

None

Total

The SEC independently evaluates the peer review process including the effectiveness
of Board oversight. The SEC conducts an independent inspection of a sample of peer reviewer
workpapers and Board oversight workpapers under an arrangement agreed to by the section. All
workpapers are masked so as not to reveal the identity of individual clients. Under a 1982 mod
ification of that arrangement, workpapers relating to firms with fewer than ten SEC clients are
masked to conceal the identity of the reviewed firm in order to reduce further the possibility of
client identification.
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The SEC continues to have a high level of interest in the program and has actively sup
ported it by both constructive suggestions and public endorsement. Based on its inspection of
1982 peer review workpapers, as described above, the SEC has again expressed satisfaction
with the peer review process and the effectiveness of the Board’s oversight procedures. The SEC
Report states that “ the Commission has determined that it can rely to a great extent on the
f o b ’s oversight function in fulfilling its own oversight responsibilities.” 3

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS
Member firms are required to report to the special investigations committee each litiga
tion and proceeding (case) against them or members of their firms involving allegations of failure
in the conduct of an audit of the financial statements of an SEC registrant The committee deter
mines whether such allegations indicate a need for improvements in the quality control systems
of such firms or whether changes in professional standards are required.

Objectives of the Process
Investigation of a firm’s quality control system supplements the peer review process as
a means of protecting users of financial statements. Unlike governmental regulation, which
focuses on an alleged audit failure as a matter deserving possible punitive action, the commit
tee’s investigative process focuses on reducing the possibility of future failures. It does so by (1)
identifying deficiencies in the auditing firm’s quality control system that may have permitted the
alleged deficiency to occur and (2) causing such deficiencies to be corrected. The special inves
tigative process protects the public by reducing the likelihood of a recurrence through remedy
and improvement

Operation of the Committee
One or two committee members are assigned to each reported case, and each case is
subjected to one or more of four levels of examination: screening, monitoring, investigating cer
tain aspects of the firm’s quality control system, and investigating the specific alleged audit
failure.
During screening, the committee considers whether the charges regarding possible
audit failure appear to have substance. In some cases, a mere reading of the complaint and the
financial statements to which it relates permit the committee to conclude that allegations are
without merit. In other cases, the preliminary review needs to be supplemented by a discussion
of the allegations with representatives of the auditing firm and a review of the findings of the
firm’s most recent peer review.
If the results of the screening process warrant, the committee monitors the case in order
to follow and evaluate future developments. For example, a case may be monitored pending the
results of a peer review in process, issuance of a bankruptcy trustee’s report or further discussion
with firm representatives.

3Securities and Exchange Commission, op. c it.
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If the committee concludes that a failure in the firm’s quality control system may have
occurred and there is a reasonable possibility for a recurrence, it conducts an investigation of the
relevant aspects of the firm’s quality control system. If the findings of the investigation warrant,
it requires the firm to amend its quality control policies and procedures accordingly.

Status of Reported Cases
Since the inception of the special investigative process in November 1979, sixty-six
cases of alleged audit failure involving SEC registrants have been reported. In addition, the com
mittee obtained the consent of the firms involved to add to its agenda two cases involving nonSEC registrants.
The committee has closed its files on forty-three cases. O f these, twenty-eight were
closed after being screened, twelve after being monitored, and three after an investigation of the
firm had been conducted. Of the remaining cases, thirteen are being screened, ten are being mon
itored, and two cases involving the same firm are being investigated. A summary of committee
activity is shown in Table 5.

TABLE5

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE ACTIVITY
FOR THE PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 1 , 1979 (INCEPTION)
THROUGH JUNE 3 0 , 1983

Screening
Cases reported by member firms

Monitoring

Investigation
of Firm

68

Action taken:
Determined that developments should be
monitored
Authorized an investigation
Closed the case
Status of cases at June 3 0 , 1983

(25)

25

(2)
(28)

(3)
(12)

5*
(3)

13

10

2

* Two cases involve one firm.

Investigations of Firm s
To date, the committee has conducted investigations of selected aspects of the quality
control systems of four member firms. The committee dictated the scope of and supervised the
conduct of each of the investigations that were performed either by the investigated firm’s pre
vious peer reviewer or by a special task force. These investigative teams generally examined
other engagements supervised by personnel involved in the alleged failure and engagements in
-
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similar industries and with similar accounting and auditing issues to those involved in the reported
litigation. Findings of the investigations were reviewed by one or more committee members
assigned to the investigation and discussed by the full committee. Three of the four inves
tigations resulted in recommendations for improvement in the firm’s quality control system or
compliance therewith, all of which were voluntarily implemented by each of the firms. The files
on three of the investigations have been closed, but the committee is keeping its file open on the
fourth investigation pending the receipt of the findings of an ongoing review to determine
whether the suggested improvements have in fact been implemented. None of the four inves
tigations resulted in discovery of a deficiency in the firm’s quality control system so major that
the imposition of a sanction was warranted

Investigations of Alleged A udit Failures
Although the committee’s charter document provides that it may, with prior executive
committee approval, investigate a specific alleged audit failure prior to completion of litigation,
the conduct of such an investigation has not yet occurred and it is expected that such an inves
tigation rarely will be necessary. The Board believes that the committee’s authority to inves
tigate a specific alleged audit failure should continue. However, this action should be reserved
for limited situations such as ascertaining whether there is a deficiency in a firm’s quality control
system or in generally accepted auditing standards that cannot be ascertained by other
means.
Certain practical limitations affect the committee’s ability to conduct an investigation
of a specific alleged failure. In fact, the capacity of the committee to conduct an investigation is
far more limited than that of private litigants or the SEC. For example, it cannot take testimony
of witnesses under oath and it cannot subpoena documents or witnesses. It must rely on the
willingness of the audit firm to supply evidence. Hence, were it to pass judgment on a firm or an
individual in connection with an alleged audit failure, it would not have as firm a basis for that
judgment as would the SEC or a court. The danger of an unfair result would be significant. Com
pounding the problem is the fact that private litigants might then use this conclusion, founded on
an insufficient record, as evidence in civil litigation.
Since the primary objective of the special investigative process is preventive and not
punitive, the committee can accomplish its objective effectively by conducting an investigation
of the firm’s quality control system without the risks inherent in an investigation of the specific
alleged audit failure.
The Board believes that the special investigative process has no need to duplicate the
work of the SEC or the civil courts. Rather, the committee’s responsibility is (1) to determine
whether charges in litigation or other proceedings involving audit performance indicate that
there are insufficiencies in auditing standards or the quality controls of the auditing firm that
require remedial action and (2) to ascertain that such remedial action is taken so that whatever
gave rise to the charges should not again be the source of problems.

Procedures
During its entire three-year existence, the committee has continuously improved its
operational procedures. In a typical case, committee members read the complaint and other
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publicly available materials. In addition, committee members routinely interview firm represen
tatives with respect to the allegations, quality controls in areas of the alleged audit failure, the
present responsibilities of the personnel involved in the litigation and the date of the last peer
review or internal inspection of the office and partner involved in the litigation. The committee
members may also interview the firm’s most recent peer reviewer and examine peer review
workpapers and reports to gain a better understanding of the firm’s quality control policies and
procedures and general compliance therewith.
The committee, with the cooperation of the firms involved, has actively pursued the
quality control implications of each reported alleged audit failure. In this connection, during the
past year the committee members (1) met with firm representatives on twenty-one cases to dis
cuss the allegations and the firm’s relevant quality control policies and procedures, (2) read peer
review reports and selected workpapers on all firms involved in litigation, made an extensive
review of workpapers on five occasions, and met with the firm’s peer reviewer on three occasions,
(3) obtained advice on accounting and auditing issues from authoritative sources within the
Institute, and (4) reviewed reports of investigations concerning reported cases conducted by
public bodies.
Before the committee authorizes an investigation of a firm or recommends an investiga
tion of a specific alleged audit failure, the firm’s representatives are invited to appear before the
committee to present their views on the matter and respond to committee questions.
The committee uses internal guidelines to provide a consistent basis for reviewing and
deciding upon action to be taken with regard to reported litigation. These guidelines are not rules
that are rigidly followed, but they assist the committee in its decision-making process and reflect
the practices that have evolved during the committee’s three-year existence.

Confidentiality of Committee Actions
The Board and its staff believe the committee’s actions to date constitute an aggressive
self-regulation effort of which, unfortunately, the public is largely unaware. However, rules
require that the committee conduct its affairs in privacy, beyond the glare of publicity and
without public disclosure, except in extreme and unusual cases. This requirement of privacy is
not to shield members of the profession or deny the public information it is entitled to have. The
section considers privacy essential to allow the committee to operate effectively and to avoid
prejudicing a member firm while litigation is in process. The Board is not insensitive to sugges
tions that means be found to ease the restraints of privacy now surrounding the committee’s
activities. The Board, however, opposes any such action that would unfairly prejudice the rights
of any firm or deny any firm the opportunity to answer charges in the forum provided by law,
which permits them as well as their adversaries full access to the evidence necessary to assure
that justice is done.

Board Oversight of 1982-83 Activities
Since the Board’s last report, the committee has held nine meetings, and committee
members assigned to specific cases under investigation have each held several meetings with
personnel of the firms involved. Members of the Board and its staff attended most of these
meetings.
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The Board has complete access to all committee files and actively monitors the commit
tee’s decisions on individual cases. The Board’s staff reads the pertinent court documents, finan
cial information, and correspondence related to reported cases, and it attends, at its discretion,
meetings between firm representatives and committee members. In addition, the staff reviews
the committee’s workpapers on all investigations.
The Board concurs with the direction and thrust of the special investigative process and
believes the process is functioning effectively.

Board Liaison with the SEC
The Board and its staff meet periodically with the chairman and staff members of the
SEC to discuss the various aspects of the self-regulatory program. In these meetings, operating
under the privacy requirement imposed on the special investigative process, the section and the
Board have attempted to provide sufficient information to the SEC so as to permit it to have con
fidence in the effectiveness of the process and the Board’s oversight thereof. However, the SEC
believes that it needs additional information to reach an independent conclusion regarding the
special investigative process. Exploratory discussions between the section, the SEC, and the
Board are continuing; in the long run, the Board hopes to persuade the SEC to rely to a large
degree upon the Board’s oversight of the special investigative process.

SECTION MEMBERSHIP
Almost 1,700 firms belong to the division for CPA firms; 426 belong to both the private
companies and SEC sections and 1,259 belong only to the private companies section. Member
firms represent approximately 3,800 practice units, 16,500 partners, and 100,000 professional
staff members. While the number of member firms decreased during the past year, the number of
SEC clients audited by member firms and the number of professionals employed by member
firms both increased during the past year. Details are shown in Table 6.

TA B LE 6

ANALYSIS OF MEMBERSHIP
IN THE DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
JUNE 30, 1982 AND JUNE 30, 1983

Classification

Both Sections
Increase
1982
1983 (Decrease)

Number of firms

1,882

1,685

(197)

Number of SEC clients

9,865

10,330

Number of practice units

3,986

3,771

Number of professionals

99,398

100,024
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SEC Section
Increase
1982
1983 (Decrease)
428

426

465

9,618

10,147

529

(215)

1,941

1,957

16

626

79,548

83,925

4,377

(2)

A uditors o f P ublicly-traded C om panies
Firms that are members of the division continue to have a significant impact on the
quality of audits of publicly-traded companies. Three hundred eleven member firms audit 87
percent of all public companies listed in the ninth edition of Who Audits America.4 A s shown in
Table 7, these companies account for over 98 percent of the combined sales volume of all
publicly-traded companies.

TABLE 7

ANALYSIS OF
FIRMS THAT AUDIT PUBLICLY-TRADED COMPANIES*
LISTED IN THE NINTH EDITION OF WHO AUDITS AMERICA
Annual Sales**
SEC Registrants
Number

Percent

Dollar

Percent

Companies audited by members of
the division for CPA Firms
$3,568,045

96.1%

By the eight largest firms

5,959

70.0%

By other firms

1,265

14.9

92,316

2.5

148

1.7

2,135

.1

By firms that are members only
o f PCPS

7,372

Total

86.6%

$3,662,496

98.7%

Companies audited by foreign
firms

64

.7

34,957

.9

Companies whose auditors are
not identified

154

1.8

4,917

.1

Companies audited by U.S. firms
not members of the division

924

10.9

11,710

.3

8,514

100%

$3,714,080

100%

* Does not include the following types of companies filing with the SEC: limited partnerships, employee
stock option plans, smaller companies in various stages of bankruptcy, etc.
** Annual sales of less than $1 million are not reported in Who Audits America. Sales of each such com
pany are estimated at $500 thousand in the above analysis.

4 Who Audits America, 9th ed. (Menlo Park, Calif.: D ata Financial Press, 1982.)
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Members of the division audit all but three of the U.S. companies whose stocks are lis
ted on the New York Stock Exchange and all but twenty-four of the U.S. companies listed on the
American Stock Exchange.

M embership Promotion
While the statistics cited above are impressive, a broader base of membership is needed
to provide the public with the full benefits of the self-regulatory program. Division membership
now stands at 1,685 firms, down from a high o f 2,200 firms in 1980. SEC section membership is
426 firms, down from a high of 579 firms in 1979. While membership in the SEC section
remained relatively constant during the twelve months ended June 3 0 , 1983, membership in the
private companies section decreased by 195. Table 8 presents an analysis of membership as of
June 30, 1983, and changes in membership for the year then ended. It should be noted that
mergers among member firms account for a decrease of thirty-nine member firms.

TABLE8

12
25

(13)
(22)

(6)
(1)

(2)

No SEC clients
Both sections or SECPS only
PCPS only

223
1,338

41
153

(28)
(278)

(6)
(25)

(1)
(45)

Totals
Both sections or SECPS only
PCPS only

428
1,454

53
178

(41)
(300)

(13)
(26)

(1)
(47)

1,882

231

(341)

(39)

(48)

Grand Totals

-

—

15

-

(1)
—

—

—

—

June 30, 1983

160
115

—

—

Classification
Changes—Net

One to four SEC clients
Both sections or SECPS only
PCPS only

—

Terminations

45
1

Mergers

Five or more SEC clients
Both sections or SECPS only
PCPS only

Resignations

Number of Firms by Number of
SEC Clients

June 3 0 , 1982

New Members

ANALYSIS OF MEMBERSHIP
IN THE DIVISION FOP CPA FIRMS
BY NUMBER OF SEC CLIENTS AND BY SECTION
JUNE 30, 1982 TO JUNE 30, 1983

(1)
2

43
3

1
1

154
116

—

(3)

—

—
—

229
1,140
426
1,259
1,685

While the self-regulatory objectives of both sections are similar, the SEC section has an
additional goal, i.e., to improve the quality of practice before the Securities and Exchange Com
mission. Consistent with that goal, the section has established certain additional member
ship requirements.
One hundred nineteen firms that audit SEC clients are members of the private com
panies section only; these firms audit 183 SEC registrants. The Board believes that every firm
that audits one or more SEC clients should join the SEC section and the SEC in its 1982 report
expressed the same view.

Im pediments to Increasing M embership
The Board believes it is important that the division identify and eliminate to the greatest
extent possible the causes for attrition and the impediments to attracting new members. In 1982,
the division engaged a research firm to determine the attitudes of members and nonmembers
about the division and the factors that might motivate members to join either or both sections.
That study revealed that the overwhelming majority of members and nonmembers support the
division, seeing it as " a forward step for the profession and an opportunity to minimize govern
ment interference and regulation.” 5
While the survey indicated satisfaction with the improvement in the quality of practice
of member firms resulting from the peer review process, it revealed several perceived impedi
ments to membership. The reasons most frequently cited by nonmember firms were that the cost
of peer review is not offset by commensurate benefits and services and that the accomplishments
of the division are virtually unknown outside the profession.

Cost o f Peer Review
The cost/benefit of peer review has received a great deal of attention since the inception
of the program. While it is difficult to generalize because of the wide differences in size and pro
file of practices among member firms, the cost of most peer reviews is generally less than one
percent of one year’s accounting and auditing fees. This is an expense incurred only once every
three years. When the benefits of peer review in terms of improved professional competence and
performance are balanced against cost figures of this sort, the Board questions whether cost is
the real issue.
One commentator, knowledgeable about the program, recently cited fear of not passing
peer review as a key impediment to the growth in membership.6 If that is the case, and the Board
suspects it may be, it should be made clear to nonmember firms that the primary purpose of peer
review is to help firms improve their performance. Commenting on the value of peer review, the
SEC Report observes: “ In a sense, peer reviews ‘should pay for themselves’ by reducing
auditors’ risks of liability to those who rely on their audits.”

5 Hill and Knowlton, M ember Services Assessment- Findings and Observations (Confi dential and Proprietary Study Performed for the AICPA,
September 1982).
6 Clint Romig, “ Peer Review Key to Continuing Professional Standards Says Louisiana CPA,” Public Accounting Report vol. VI, no. 4,
April 1983.
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Nevertheless, the Board recognizes that cost of peer review may be perceived as
exceeding its benefits and thus may be a deterrent to membership. The Board continues to sup
port any reasonable means to reduce the cost of peer review, provided they do not dilute or
appear to dilute the effectiveness of the process.
Over the course of the past five years, many suggestions have been made to reduce the
cost of peer review. Some have been implemented, including the elimination of the quality con
trol review panel and reliance on a firm’s inspection program to reduce the scope of its peer
review, both of which have been discussed previously. Other cost reduction suggestions have
been rejected, notably that the three-year peer review cycle be extended and that an alternating
cycle of full-scope/limited-scope review be adopted. The Board concurs with the section’s rejec
tion of these two proposals because it believes that they would have decreased, or would have
been perceived to have decreased, the effectiveness of the process.

Need for a Public Relations Program
During 1982, the division published its first directory of member firms. While this was
an important first step in public relations, the Board believes that the subject of education and
public relations merits urgent attention.
As an independent study revealed, both member and nonmember firms believe that the
public has not been made aware of the importance or meaning of membership in the division.7
Consequently, nonmember firms experience little, if any, external or internal pressure to
join.
As Chairman McCloy stated in his address to the Institute’s Council, the Board
believes that bankers, financial analysts, and businessmen in general are not sufficiently aware
of the self-regulatory program.8 They do not know what the peer review process is about or what
it has accomplished. In the past, it seemed premature to advertise a program while it was still
being developed. Now that both the peer review and special investigative processes are opera
tional, it seems apparent that the program has reached a stage at which it can be presented with
pride as an accomplished fact

Efforts to inform users of financial statements and others about this program appear to
offer many rewards. Not only would such efforts improve the credibility of the profession, but
they might also increase membership. If public awareness were increased, some firms that now
are unwilling to incur peer review costs and meet other membership requirements would likely
find it in their best interests to do so. This in turn would increase the effectiveness of the
program.
It should also be possible to educate nonmembers and the public about the differences
between self-regulation and governmental regulation, and point out that self-regulation empha
sizes preventive and corrective rather than punitive action.
7

Hill and Knowlton, op. c it.

8 See Exhibit I.
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There have been suggestions that the SEC might require disclosure in proxy statements
regarding whether the registrant’s auditor is a member of the division or is otherwise subject to
peer review.9 This might be effective in increasing membership, but it is a step away from self
regulation, since it depends on action by a government agency. Also it would only affect auditors
of SEC registrants. The Board would prefer to see the profession address its membership problem by
means other than seeking government action.

Performance of MAS Engagements for SEC A udit Clients
At the request of the executive committee, in May 1978, the Board undertook a major
study of the “ scope of services” issue. A variety of views were received in comment letters and in
testimony at a two-day public hearing On the question of whether an auditor who provides
management advisory services (MAS) to an audit client impairs his ability to render an indepen
dent opinion on the fairness of that client’s financial statements. In June 1978, the SEC released
Accounting Series Release no. 250 which required disclosure in proxy statements of all non
audit services furnished by a registrant’s auditor and of the percentage relationship of such fees
to audit fees.
The Board reported its findings in June 197910 and recommended, among other things,
that peer reviewers review MAS engagements performed for audit clients to test for compliance
with independence standards, and that members annually report to the section selected informa
tion about fees for MAS and tax services for SEC clients. The executive committee implemen
ted all of the Board’s recommendations.
When the SEC rescinded ASR no. 250 in January 1982, member firms were required
to report to the section additional information regarding management advisory services engage
ments performed for SEC registrants that are also audit clients of the firm. The Board monitors
the information so reported.
The Board continues to believe that audit committees and boards of directors should
review and determine what effect the performance of MAS engagements has on the indepen
dence of their auditors. Section members are required to provide audit committees or boards of
directors of their SEC clients information concerning MAS services notwithstanding rescission
of ASR no. 250. Based on its oversight of peer reviews, the Board is satisfied that member firms
are complying with the requirements. Furthermore, MAS engagements performed for SEC
registrants are considered by peer reviewers in selection of audit engagements to be reviewed,
and peer reviewers also ascertain whether the role played by the firm in the performance of MAS
engagements impairs its independence as an auditor. The Board has seen no evidence to cause it
to believe that the magnitude or the nature of MAS engagements being performed is impairing
the independence of member firms.

9Harold M. Williams, The 1980s: The Future o f the Accounting Profession, An address before the AICPA Seventh National Conference on Current
SEC Developments, January 3, 1980, Washington, D.C.
10 Public Oversight Board, Scope o f Services by CPA Firms, (New York AICPA, 1979).
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CONCLUSIONS
The division deserves to be commended for its accomplishments in fostering the highest
quality of auditing and accounting practice by its member firms. Yet, those accomplishments are
virtually unknown by either the public that benefits most from them or significant segments of
the profession itself.
The public is not aware that the peer review and special investigative processes
materially reduce the potential for audit failure. In the opinion of the Board, these two important
aspects of the program have in fact reduced the number of audit failures by fostering and improv
ing quality control systems of firms belonging to the division. The Board believes that those who
doubt the objectivity of the section’s peer review and special investigative processes would be
favorably impressed if they were made more aware of how these processes operate and what
they have accomplished. The accounting profession needs to dispel the erroneous assumption
held by some segments of the public and by some in government that every business failure is
also an audit failure. An education program should serve to heighten public confidence in the
accounting profession at a time when business failures have triggered litigation against auditors
who reported on financial statements of businesses that subsequently failed.
A final note. While the profession can be justly proud of the significant progress it has
made in the short span of five years, it must guard against a spirit of complacency and a human
tendency to backslide. As Chairman McCloy stated in his address to the 1983 spring meeting of
Council of the AICPA:
“The accounting profession’s self-regulatory program has made
a promising start—indeed a rather spectacular one. I believe the POB
is justified in placing real confidence in it. Confidence-inspiring fea
tures lie mainly in the vigor and motivation with which its progress
has been marked.
But, the program has not yet won laurels on which it can con
fidently rest or be complacent. There is a need for constant reex
amination of the program’s objectives and the profession’s dedication
to their achievement.”
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Address by Public Oversight Board Chairman John J. McCloy to A ICPA Council, May 9,
1983.
First, a few words about the com
position of the POB. Three of us
have been members of the board
since the inception of the program.
Besides myself, two former chief
executives of major companies, Ar
thur M. Wood and John D. Harper,
have completed five years of ser
vice. I am a lawyer and former chief
executive of a bank. Two former
Securities and Exchange Commis
sion chairmen, Ray Garrett, Jr., and
William L. Cary, completed our
initial five-man bo a rd . Ray Garrett
and Bill Cary made outstanding
contributions not only in the forma
tion of the board’s initial policies
and procedures but also in formulat
ing practical means for overcoming
some of its early problems. For ex
ample, Ray Garrett chaired the twoday public hearing the board held on
the scope of services question and
was the chief author of the board’s
report on the subject.1 Unfortunate
ly, both of these distinguished and
experienced men have since died.
They were replaced in 1981 by Rob
ert K. Mautz, a member of the ac
counting profession and a recipient
of the Institute’s gold medal, and in
1983 by A. A. Sommer, Jr., a law
yer, a former SEC commissioner
and a former member of the Insti
tute’s board of directors. The POB
is capably assisted by Louis Matu
siak, who has been our executive
director since the beginning, and
three full-time CPA staff members
as well as a number of part-time re
tired accountants who assist in mon
itoring the peer review process.
The board does not have and does
not wish to exert line responsibility.

Accomplishments of
the SECPS: the
POB’S assessment
Overfive years have passed since
the first meeting o f the public
oversight board (POB), which
took place in March 1978. The
POB oversees the SEC practice
section (SECPS) o f the American
Institute o f CPAs division fo r
CPA firms. In this adaptation o f
POB Chairman John J. McCloy’s
address at the AICPA council
meeting in Phoenix, Arizona, last
May, McCloy reports on the
achievements to date o f the
SEC PS’s self-regulatory pro
gram and the challenges that lie
ahead.
The public oversight board (POB)
was created to do what its name im
plies—oversee the self-regulatory
program of the SEC practice section
(SECPS) of the American Institute
of CPAs division for CPA firms. It
was to be composed of five individ
uals whose backgrounds, experi
ence and judgment would enable
them to bring objectivity to the ac
counting profession’s self-regula
tory program. The conduct of the
program is the responsibility of the
profession itself, but this indepen
dent board, composed mainly of
nonaccountants, represents the in
terests of the public, i.e., the users
of financial statements, and at the
same time assists the profession in
seeking to achieve a constantly im
proving quality of professional ser
vices.
Reprinted from the August 1983 issue of the
Journal of Accountancy.
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The program would not be self-reg
ulatory if it did. From the beginning
we have subscribed to the view that
all authority must be vested in the
profession. We can oversee, com
ment, suggest and point out; we
cannot order or demand.
The board and its staff are active
ly involved, however, in all aspects
of the self-regulatory program. We
try to attend all meetings of every
committee of the section; we also
consult on request with the SECPS
executive commiittee on emerging
issues, review every peer review of
a member firm, attend exit confer
ences held at the conclusion of peer
reviews, review the work of investi
gative teams appointed by the sec
tion’s special investigations com
mittee (SIC) and periodically confer
with the commissioners and staff of
the SEC. On one occasion we testi
fied before a congressional commit
tee.
I am pleased to report that the
SEC supports the section’s pro
gram. Chairman John S. R. Shad,
like his predecessor, Harold M.
Williams, has publicly compliment
ed the program, and Chief Accoun
tant A. Clarence Sampson’s con
structive suggestions have helped
the section find solutions to some of
its more difficult problems. In the
early stages there was apprehension
in some quarters of the profession
that the SEC might seek to impose
itself on the section in a harmful
way. To the credit of the leadership
of both the SEC and the section, this
hasn’t happened. There exists now
a healthy liaison, in part through
section officers and Institute staff
members and in part through the
POB, that I believe well serves the
respective interests.
While the POB has oversight re
sponsibility for only the SECPS,
members of the board are kept in
formed of the major developments
in the private companies practice
section (PCPS) as well. We under

stand that the PCPS has objectives,
requirements and a peer review pro
cess very similar to those of the
SECPS. In our view, member firms
of both sections deserve much cred
it for their commitment to the im
provement of the quality of ac
counting and auditing practice.
Peer review

The foundation of the accounting
profession’s self-regulatory effort is
the peer review process. The year
1983 marks the completion of the
second three-year cycle of peer re
views in the SECFS—more than
4(X) member firms have undergone
peer review. In addition, more than
1, 100 firms that belong only to the
PCPS will have been reviewed be
fore this year is out.
By subjecting their accounting
and auditing practices to peer re
view, member firms demonstrate
their dedication to achieving highquality professional service. The
board has established a comprehen
sive program for monitoring peer
reviews, and this activity consumes
the lion’s share of the time of our
staff and a significant amount of at
tention of board members. As I
mentioned earlier, board members
periodically attend peer review exit
conferences. Having attended sev
eral of these, I can testify to the
impression I received as a layman of
the seriousness and penetration that
characterized most of those confer
ences. As board member Mautz put
it so pungently in his article in the
May issue of the Journal of Accoun
tancy: “ Those cynics who see [peer
review] as an exercise in mutual
backscratching have no understand
ing of the effect of peer criticism on
proud and sensitive professionals in
a highly competitive activity.’’2
Even though some of the discus
sions are heated, I can say that a
uniform characteristic of the peer
review process is that the reviewed
-2 4
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and recalled its report, and correct
ed financial statements were re
issued. In the remaining cases, al
most all of which involved financial
statements of closely held compa
nies, the firms were already per
forming or about to perform the
subsequent year’s audit and com
mitted themselves to correct the de
ficiencies in the course of such au
dits.
The board believes that the peer
review process has been well con
ceived, is being continually modi
fied and improved with experience
and now constitutes an efficient and
key ingredient of the profession’s
self-regulatory program. Based on
the POB’S monitoring of the pro
cess over a period of several years,
we are confident that fewer nonGAAP financial statements are be
ing issued because of the peer re
view process.
As I will discuss later, member
ship in the division is declining.
One of the most often cited causes
for attrition in membership in the
SECPS, and I understand in the
PCPS as well, is the cost of peer
review. In response, the SECPS has
implemented a number of cost-sav
ing measures, such as the elimina
tion (at the board’s suggestion) of
the quality control review panel and
placing reliance on a firm’s inspec
tion program to reduce the amount
of work that peer reviewers person
ally perform. We believe these
changes have not diluted the effec
tiveness of the process. We under
stand that the PCPS also has taken
measures to reduce the cost of peer
review.
This matter of the cost of peer
review has been much discussed.
While it is difficult to generalize be
cause of the wide differences
among firms, it would appear that
the cost of most peer reviews is less
than 1 percent of one year’s ac
counting and auditing fees, and this

firm accepts and benefits from criti
cisms and suggestions made by peer
reviewers.
The primary thrust of the peer re
view process is to identify weak
nesses in a firm’s quality control
system and to insist, when appropri
ate, that the firm take corrective ac
tion. Formal sanctions are to be
considered only in rare cases when
the firm’s quality control system
can’t be relied on and the firm re
fuses to make the corrections
deemed necessary by the peer re
view committee.
The SECPS’s peer review com
mittee has imposed some rather se
vere additional requirements on
firms whose quality control systems
were deemed to be somewhat defi
cient. Since these requirements
were voluntarily agreed to by the
firms, they have not been classified
as sanctions. Correspondence be
tween the committee and the re
viewed firms detailing such addi
tional requirements are placed in the
public file. To date, 20 firms—
roughly 5 percent of the member
ship—have been required, as a con
dition of continued membership, to
undergo an accelerated full-scope
peer review, i.e., a review in the
next year or two rather than every
third year. An additional 15 firms
have had to agree to a revisit by the
peer reviewer to ascertain whether
the firm has taken appropriate cor
rective action.
There is further evidence, I be
lieve, that the peer review process is
working in the public’s and the pro
fession’s best interests. Occasional
ly, a peer reviewer will conclude
that financial statements on which
the member firm has opined were
not prepared in all material respects
in accordance with generally ac
cepted accounting principles. In ap
proximately 40 percent of such
cases, the reviewed firm concurred
with the judgment of the reviewer
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expense is incurred only once every
three years. When the benefits of
peer review in terms of improved
professional competence and per
formance are balanced against cost
figures of this sort, one must won
der whether the cost of peer review
is the real issue. I was interested to
read last month in the Public Ac
counting Report a statement by
Clinton J. Romig, a former member
of the AICPA council and currently
a member of the peer review com
mittee of the PCPS, that “ fear [by
firms] that they do not measure up
to all of the required standards is the
greatest deterrent to peer re 
views.’’3 This might be consistent
with our experience that some firms
withdraw from the SECPS as their
time for peer review approaches. If
Romig is correct, it could mean that
a number of firms lack an under
standing of peer review or that their
quality controls are in fact inad
equate. Of course, some firms may
just be unwilling to be bothered
with peer review irrespective of the
adequacy of their controls. This
would mean they are overlooking
an opportunity for improvement.
None of these alternatives seems
very attractive in terms of overall
quality standards of the profession
and protection of the public. Per
haps I am guilty of oversimplifica
tion, but if there is any merit in
these observations, the profession
may wish to consider the need for a
program of education and persua
sion in order to improve the perfor
mance of the profession through the
broadest possible acceptance of
peer review.
The recently issued 1982 annual
report of the SEC is bullish on peer
review. The report observes that
“ peer reviews should ‘pay for
themselves’ by reducing auditors’
risks of liability to those who rely
on their audits.’’4
As you know, the SECPS and the
SEC have worked out an arrange

ment under which the SEC inspects
POB oversight work papers and has
access on a sampling basis to speci
fied peer reviewers’ work papers.
As a result of this review, the SEC
has indicated its satisfaction with
the process. In its 1981 report to
Congress, the SEC stated that the
“ standards for performing and re
porting on peer reviews are appro
priate . . . [and] are being mean
ingfully applied’’5 and, in its 1982
report, that it “ can rely to a great
extent on the POB’s oversight func
tion in fulfilling its own oversight
responsibilities.’’6
In summary, the board believes
that the peer review process has
been very successful to date. While
peer review can never be a guaran
tee against audit failures, we be
lieve that the process has improved
the quality of the audits performed
by members of both sections.
Special investigations committee

One of the first matters considered
by the POB was what action, if any,
should be taken by the SECPS with
respect to alleged or possible audit
failures involving SEC clients of
member firms. Because significant
Situations involving alleged audit
failures are generally investigated
by the SEC or result in private liti
gation, there was a question about
whether the section should get in
volved at all. There was also the
question of whether the section
should defer any proceeding until
the conclusion of litigation and gov
ernmental proceedings so as not to
prejudice the firm involved. The
board, keeping public interest in
mind, recommended that when pro
ceedings or litigation indicated pos
sible audit failure, the section
should ascertain whether such pro
ceedings or litigation stemmed from
a deficiency in the quality controls
of the auditing firm or an insuffi
ciency in auditing standards, requir
ing corrective action. The protec
-

26

-

Exhibit I
Page 5 o f 8

tion of the users of financial state
ments would be the paramount con
cern. Disciplinary procedures look
ing toward punishment of the audit
ing firm were thought to be less
important; besides, the firm in
volved would most likely be facing
actions by governmental and regu
latory bodies and private litigants.
As a result of lengthy discussions
between the board and the SECPS
executive committee, the SIC was
created by special resolution of the
executive committee in 1979. At all
stages in the development of these
procedures, the balancing of the in
terests of the profession and the
public received the most careful at
tention.
Members of the SECPS are re
quired to report to the SIC any liti
gation or proceedings against them
or members of their firms involving
SEC registrants. The SIC screens
and reviews such cases to the extent
necessary to determine whether an
investigation is warranted. To date,
member firms have reported over
60 cases of litigation or other pro
ceedings against them involving
SEC registrants.
The committee has screened and
closed a number of the reported
cases. Others are being monitored
for further developments and four
investigations have been undertak
en. To date, no investigation has
resulted in discovery of a deficiency
in the investigated firm’s quality
control system so important that the
imposition of a sanction was war
ranted. In three instances, however,
suggested improvements to the
firm’s quality control system were
voluntarily implemented by the in
vestigated firm. Incidentally, mem
bers of smaller firms will be inter
ested to learn that all four
investigations to date have involved
larger firms.
The POB and its staff follow
closely all of the SIC’s activities
and have full knowledge of all cases

reported. One or more members of
the board’s staff have attended all
SIC meetings and a board member
has also attended most of them.
Based on this observation, we be
lieve that the SIC takes seriously its
responsibilities and is equipped and
disposed to make reasoned, wellfounded decisions. It has already
made some tough ones. Anyone
who thinks the SIC is designed to
gloss over the transgressions of fel
low accountants would, I believe,
seriously underestimate the quality
of the process and the dedication of
the members of the committee and
of the section’s executive commit
tee to which it reports.
But the SIC poses a conundrum.
One of the objectives of the SIC is
to provide additional assurance to
the public that member firms are
complying with professional stan
dards in the conduct of their SEC
practices. However, the rules of the
SECPS require that SIC proceed
ings be conducted in privacy to all
but the POB, and this requirement is
carefully observed by everyone.
This is tantamount to asking the
public and the SEC to accept on
faith that the SIC is doing its job as
intended or, at best, to take the
POB’s word for it. On this matter,
the board doesn’t have a solution
because we understand and accept
the need for privacy in proceedings
of this character.
There is, unfortunately, a public
expectation that the SIC should
function in a manner similar to the
governmental regulatory model.
The public, including some people
in government, do not seem to dif
ferentiate between governmental
regulation and self-regulation.
Many believe the SIC—and thus the
entire self-regulatory program—
will lack credibility unless sanc
tions are regularly imposed and
publicized.
The Mautz article mentioned ear
lier highlights the sharp differences
-
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between governmental regulation
and self-regulation. Governmental
regulation, the model best known to
the public, treats audit failure as a
matter deserving punitive action.
Self-regulation, appropriately con
cerned with protecting the public,
focuses on methods to prevent or
reduce the possibility of future audit
failures. The POB wholeheartedly
endorses self-regulation and be
lieves that a self-regulatory pro
gram does not have to emulate the
governmental regulatory model to
be effective. In essence, self-regu
lation is complementary to govern
mental regulation and deals with
practical corrective measures which
government is less well equipped to
handle.
As I mentioned earlier, our board
maintains liaison with the SEC on
various aspects of the SECPS’s ac
tivities. The nature of our liaison
with respect to SIC matters is still
being developed because of the dif
ficulty of balancing the understan
dable desires of the section for con
fidentiality against the SEC staffs
belief that it should have more in
formation in order to evaluate this
aspect of self-regulation. However,
we hope to persuade the SEC to rely
to a large degree on the POB’s over
sight of SIC activities.
For several years there was con
cern within the SECPS and the POB
that the procedure for dealing with a
cause célèbre audit failure was not
firmly in place and that the self-reg
ulatory program could suffer a seri
ous setback if such a case arose and
was poorly handled. The board be
lieves this is no longer a serious
concern. In the POB’s view, the
SIC program and procedures are
well conceived, the committee is
well established and it is performing
its task diligently and effectively.
The board believes that the SIC has
already demonstrated its ability to
deal with difficult cases with firm
ness and fairness. At the same time,
the credibility problems resulting

from the privacy requirement I
mentioned earlier and the unrealis
tic expectations on the part of the
public and some people in govern
ment are matters of continuing con
cern.
Membership

The division for firms has a signifi
cant impact on the quality of audits
of publicly traded companies. As
the POB reported in its last annual
report, over 86 percent of such com
panies are audited by firms belong
ing to the division. Even more im
pressive is the fact that those
companies account for over 98 per
cent of the sales volume of all pub
licly traded companies.
However, analysis of member
ship data reveals a disturbing trend.
Membership in the division reached
an all-time high of 2,200 firms in
the fall of 1980. Currently, only
1,700 firms are members—a pre
cipitous drop of 500 firms. There
are undoubtedly a variety of reasons
for this decline, some of which the
division has little or no control over.
I have already mentioned concern
with peer review costs. It seems to
us, though, that some actions could
be taken to increase membership.
While the division has embarked on
several membership campaigns, lit
tle has been done to create external
pressure to encourage nonmembers
to join.
Public relations

The accounting profession’s selfregulatory program is perhaps one
of its best-kept secrets. Bankers, fi
nancial analysts, businessmen in
general and perhaps even the major
ity of clients know very little about
this constructive program on which
the profession has embarked. Yet, I
don’t know of any article on this
topic that has appeared in a nonac
counting publication.
Very few persons outside the pro
fession are aware of what the peer
review process is about or what it
-
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has accomplished. Several years
have been spent getting the divi
sion’s program in place and func
tioning. In the past it may have
seemed premature to advertise a
program still being developed. Now
we believe the program has reached
the stage at which it can be present
ed with pride as an accomplished
fact. Accordingly, we believe the
subject of education and public rela
tions merits urgent attention. Ef
forts to inform users of financial
statements and nonmembers of the
division about this progam would
seem to offer many rewards. Such
efforts would improve the credibil
ity of the profession as well as in
crease the desire of accounting
firms to participate in the division’s
program, which in turn would in
crease the effectiveness of the pro
gram. If public awareness was in
creased, perhaps some firms that
now aren’t willing to spend the time
and effort to undergo peer review
and to meet other membership re
quirements would find it in their
best interest to do so. Also, it
should be possible to educate the
public regarding the emphasis that
self-regulation places on corrective
action rather than on punitive ac
tion.
There have been suggestions that
the SEC might require some disclo
sure in proxy statements on whether
the registrant’s auditor is a member
of the division or is otherwise sub
ject to peer review. This might be
effective in increasing membership,
but it is a step away from self-regu
lation, since it depends on action by
a governmental agency. Also, it
would affect only auditors of SEC
registrants. Our board would prefer
to see the profession address its
membership problem by means oth
er than seeking governmental ac
tion.

Conclusion

I recognize that this has been a rath
er sketchy summary of the program
of the SECPS as I view it from the
vantage point of the POB. The ac
counting profession can be justly
proud of its program’s accomplish
ments to date. I know of no other
profession’s self-regulatory pro
gram which can approximate the ac
counting profession’s in imagina
tion and scope.
I take considerable comfort from
the fact that, although the POB is
primarily composed of nonaccoun
tants, we now have on the board an
accountant whose point of view can
constitute a valuable asset to the
board as it attempts to help improve
the profession’s self-regulatory pro
gram.
As Bob Mautz pointed out in his
article, there are a number of quite
falsely entertained expectations
about what the self-regulatory pro
gram of the accounting profession
can or should be able to effect.
There are quite enough reasonable
expectations which the program can
properly be called on to fulfill with
out compelling it to respond to a
number of unjustified ones. No
firm’s quality control system is go
ing to be perfect and audit failures,
though hopefully diminished, will
still occur. But this is no cause for
unjust criticism or, much less, de
spair.
The accounting profession’s selfregulatory program has made a
promising start—indeed, a rather
spectacular one. I believe we are
justified in placing real confidence
in it Confidence-inspiring features
lie mainly in the vigor and motiva
tion with which its progress has
been marked.
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But the program has not yet won
laurels on which it can confidently
rest or be complacent. There is a
need for constant reexamination of
the program’s objectives and the
profession’s dedication to their
achievement. ■

1Public Oversight Board Report: Scope of
Services by CPA Firms (New York: AICPA,
1979).
2Robert K. Mautz, “ Self-Regulation—Per
ils and Problems,” JofA, May83, p.82.
3Clinton J. Romig, ‘‘Peer Review Key to
Continuing Professional Standards Says
Louisiana CPA,” Public Accounting Re
port, April 1983, p . 16.
4Securities and Exchange Commission, An
nual Report 1982 (Washington, D.C.: Gov
ernment Printing Office, 1982), p . 16.
5SEC Annual Report 1981 (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, 1981), p.28.
6SEC, Annual Report 1982. p . 16.
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COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD

Member

Term Expires
December 31

Affiliation

John J. McCloy
Chairman

1983

Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy, New York

Arthur M. Wood
Vice Chairman

1985

Former chairman and chief executive
officer of Sears, Roebuck & Co,

John D. Harper

1985

Former chairman of Communications
Satellite Corporation and former chair
man and chief executive officer of
Aluminum Company of America

Robert K. Mautz

1984

Director of Paton Accounting Center and
Professor of Accounting, University of
Michigan

A. A. Sommer, Jr.

1984

Partner, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and
former SEC commissioner

Richard A. Stark

Legal Counsel
to the Board

Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley &
McCloy, New York

Permanent Staff
Louis W. Matusiak
Charles J. Evers
David P, Boxer
Alan H. Feldman
Marcia E. Brown
Miriam Freilich

Executive Director and Secretary
Technical Director
Assistant Technical Director
Assistant Technical Director
Administrative Assistant
Secretary

Supplemental Staff
Sidney M. Braudy
John W. Hawekotte
John W. Nicholson

Retired partner of Main Lafrentz & Co.
Retired partner of Arthur Andersen & Co.
Retired partner of Arthur Young
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PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
STATEMENT OF ESTIMATED EXPENSES
FOR THE YEAR ENDED JULY 3 1 , 1983

$173,500

Regular fees of Board members
Reimbursement of expenses to Board members and
their firms
Salaries of staff, including part-time reviewers

16,700
402,700

Personnel

58,200

Occupancy

81,600

Staff travel and related expenses

23,000

Printing and paper

12,300

Legal expenses*

68,000

General office expenses

29,600
$865,600

Total expenses

* Paid to Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy
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Excerp t from 1982 SEC Report to Congress on Oversight of the Accounting Profession.

Accounting Matters
Oversight o f the Accounting Profession—The Commission has historically
monitored, relied on and encouraged initiatives in the standard-setting processes
of the private sector, subject to Commission oversight, through frequent staff
contact with the private sector standard-setting organizations, attendance at or
participation in meetings, public hearings, and task forces, and review and com
ment during the standard setting process. Moreover, this contact speeds refer
ral of emerging problems found in company filings to the right private group
for resolution. Although the Commission will continue to seek to fulfill its
statutory responsibility by close oversight of private sector initiatives, it will not
hesitate to take appropriate regulatory action when necessary.
SEC Practice Section and Peer Review—As of June 30, 1982, 428 accoun
ting firms had voluntarily become members of the Division for CPA Firms of
the American institute of Certified Public Accountants and particularly its SEC
Practice Section (SECPS); these firms audit over 90% of all publicly held com
panies. Firms that are members of the SECPS are subject to certain re
quirements designed to improve the quality of their audit and accounting prac
tice. Among these are the filing of an annual report, the maintenance of a system
of quality control, and the testing of that system once every three years through
an independent peer review process.
An independent Public Oversight Board (POB) oversees and annually reports
on the SECPS. In Its report dated June 30, 1982, the POB concluded that “the
self-regulatory structure is sound and is functioning properly." 36Based on its
oversight of the 400 peer reviews which had been conducted, the POB con
cluded that “there is now considerable evidence that the peer review program
is functioning as intended and that section members are taking actions need
ed to improve the quality of their practice.” 37
Although peer reviews provide no assurance that ail audit failures will be
identified or avoided in the future, any audit failures that occur should be due
to isolated breakdowns or “people problems,” and not to inherent deficiencies
In firms’ system of quality control. In a sense, peer reviews should “pay for
themselves” by reducing auditors’ risks of liability to those who rely on their
audits.
(1) Access Agreement—Under the terms of an “access” arrangement agreed
to by the SECPS and the Commission, for the first time the Commission’s staff
reviewed a sample of the working papers underlying reviews. Based on this
review and the staff's review of the POB’s oversight files, the Commission has
determined that It can rely to a great extent on the POB’s oversight function
in fulfilling its own oversight responsibilities. Nevertheless, the Commission will
continue to monitor the peer review process by reviewing certain working papers
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pursuant to the access arrangement so that it can periodically evaluate this im
portant self-regulatory initiative and the need for refinements in the process
as a result of changing professional, economic and regulatory conditions.
(2) Sanctions—The true test of any voluntary self-regulatory organization is
whether it appropriately sanctions members that do not meet its standards.
There are two aspects to the SECP's disciplinary procedures. First, the SECPS
may impose sanctions as a result of serious quality control deficiencies un
covered during peer reviews. While the SECPS has not imposed any “formal”
sanctions to date, some peer reviewed firms have voluntarily agreed to take
and report prompt appropriate corrective action. The Commission concurs with
the POB’s belief that this informal process gives the SECPS the ability to act
promptly and achieves the same result as the imposition of a sanction. The
formal sanction process remains available and should be used when satisfac
tory corrective measures are not undertaken promptly or where a member firm
chooses not to cooperate.38
Pursuant to the second aspect of the SECP's disciplinary procedures, member
firms are required to report to the Special Investigations Committee (SIC) litiga
tion against them or their personnel and proceedings or investigations public
ly announced by a regulatory agency that involve clients or former clients which
are or were registrants and that allege deficiencies in the conduct of an audit
or in reporting thereon in connection with any required filing under the Federal
securities laws. The SIC considers whether these allegations indicate the need
for corrective measures by such firms, changes in professorial standards, and/or
appropriate disciplinary measures. The POB believes that the SIC made signifi
cant progress during the past year and that, although the structure for impos
ing sanctions has not yet been tested, the SECPS will appropriately discipline
member firms. 39The Commission thus far has no basis for reaching any con
clusion and believes that visible evidence as to specific SIC activity is critical
to demonstrate to the public the effectiveness of this aspect of the professions
self-regulation.
The Commission continues to believe that all accounting firms which audit
public companies should join the SECPS. During the past year, a number of
changes were made to SECPS membership requirements which the SECPS
believes will significantly reduce the costs of membership while maintaining
an effective self-regulatory program. The principal change was the elimination
of the requirement that a quality control review panel (QCRP) be appointed
for peer reviews conducted by firms or administered by associations of firms.
The Commission does not object to the SECP’s determination to eliminate the
QCRP. The Commission supports other initiatives designed to facilitate member
ship in the SECPS provided that they do not detract from the credibility of
the self-regulatory program.
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SELF-REGULATIONPERILS AND PROBLEMS
Changing unrealistic
expectations about
the self-regulatory
process is a major
task of the SECPS.
by Robert K. Mautz
Embarking on a program of self-regulation is
anything but risk-free. An important and per
haps unrecognized risk is the danger that ex
pectations about the program may not be met
and that this could encourage unwise actions.
Unfulfilled expectations may result from in
adequate performance of the self-regulatory
process or from unrealistic expectations. The
profession's experience, to date, suggests that
unrealistic expectations may be the greater
danger.
Unrealistic expectations arise because crit
ics of the self-regulatory process—and even
some participants—fail to recognize that
□ Self-regulation is unavoidably limited in
scope, operating within the constraints im
posed by an already existing and rigorous dis
ciplinary system.
□ Any regulatory activity, and self-regula
tion in particular, requires a difficult balanc
ing of private rights and public good.
□ Self-regulation differs from public regula
tion in motivation, method and purpose.
The Scope of Regulation

If one considers regulation in the broadest
sense, the complexity of the total process is
overwhelming. It includes, on the one hand,
Author's note: Initially presented as my views in a talk pre
pared for the American Institute of CPAs tenth national con
ference on current SEC developments, this adaptation has
since been reviewed by the public oversight board (POB) of
the SEC practice section of the AICPA division for CPA firms
and generally expresses the board's sentiments. The POB
oversees the self-regulatory efforts of the SEC practice sec
tion. The conference was held in Washington, D .C ., last Janu
ary 11 and 12.
Reprinted from the May 1983 issue of the
Journal of Accountancy.
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such considerations as the maintenance of an
economic and legal environment conducive to
the continued provision of professional ser
vices for those who desire them and, on the
other hand, sufficient control of conditions so
that competition in the provision of those ser
vices does not fail and a monopoly does not
emerge to exploit society’s needs. It involves
acceptance of the fact that the contracting for
and the performance of services will from
time to time result in misunderstandings or
disagreements about the cost or quality of the
services performed. When this occurs, a sys
tem for adjudicating such disputes is needed,
a system that is recognized as both authorita
tive and equitable to all parties.
When members of the public are unable to
evaluate the quality of a service because of its
technical nature, a licensing provision requir
ing practitioners to meet established qualifica
tions, perhaps including examination, may be
appropriate. In addition, standards of perfor
mance must be established together with some
means of reviewing that performance to pro
tect the lay public from substandard practice.
Finally, on those relatively rare occasions
when performance deviates so far from the
norm that sanctions are in order, the authority
to impose and enforce sanctions becomes a
part of the regulatory process.
Given a fresh start and no limitations, one
might invent a program of self-regulation that
includes all the activities described. To do so
might be interesting, but it would not be a
very useful activity. Society has indicated no
desire to free accounting, or any other profes
sion, from all of the regulatory mechanisms
now in place. Agencies with far greater powR O B E R T K. M AUTZ, CPA, Ph.D., is a member of the public
oversight board of the SEC practice section of the American
Institute of CPAs division for CPA firms and is director of the
Paton Accounting Center at the University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor. A member of the Accounting Hall of Fame, Dr. Mautz
is a past president of the American Accounting Association
and a former editor of the Accounting Review; he also has
served on the AICPA council and board of directors. In 1980
he was awarded the Gold Medal, the Institute's highest honor.
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ers than any possessed by the accounting pro
fession police competition in the economy.
An existing system of courts settles civil dis
putes. Licensing powers are reserved for the
states. A multiplicity of federal and local po
licing organizations are constantly on the alert
for criminal activity. The Securities and Ex
change Commission has been assigned regu
latory responsibilities that it shows no sign of
relinquishing, and it couldn’t relinquish these
responsibilities even if it would.
Viewed realistically, self-regulation is but
one element in a complex system of controls.
Society entrusts to a self-regulating profession
a limited set of privileges, among them the
right and responsibility to develop, establish,
review and refine standards of professional
performance. Society does so at least partly
because it believes the technical expertise and
situational understanding of members of the
profession qualify them to perform that role
effectively. There is no reason, nor has ac
counting the ability, to challenge the other
participants in the total regulatory structure. If
accountants perform their role satisfactorily,
the tasks of the others will all be eased. Ac
countants have a small niche in the total regu
latory process but an important one.
Private Rights and
Public Responsibility

Establishing and maintaining appropriate
standards of professional performance de
mand a proper balance of private rights and
public responsibility. In a perceptive article
entitled “ The Professions Under Siege’’ Jac
ques Barzun takes note of the diminishing sta
tus of the professions, including accounting,
the unavoidable conflict of interest between
members of a profession and the lay public
that uses its services, the vulnerability of the
professions to public displeasure and the real
dangers of public regulation.1
Professionals ask for special privileges, in
cluding the exclusion from practice of those
who don’t qualify. In return for privileges,
society demands superior performance, high
ethical behavior and very rare failures. Absent
society’s satisfaction, the profession’s privi
leges are endangered.
1Jacques Barzun, "T he Professions Under Siege,” Harper's,
October 1978, pp.61-68.

Balancing private rights and public respon
sibilities is a difficult matter indeed, one
Barzun contends is well beyond the
scope of codes and policing. In
his view, what is needed
is a moral regeneration
“ which can come
about only when the
members of a
group feel

once more confident that ethical behavior is
desirable, widely practiced, approved, and
admired.’’2To establish and maintain such a
condition should be part of the goal of self
regulation.
But how are such high-sounding goals to be
achieved in the practical, down-to-earth,
highly competitive world of accounting? Ac
complishment is neither easy nor impossible,
but the problems involved are gaining increas
ing attention in the profession where the spot
light has been focused on the American Insti
tute of CPAs division for CPA firms, which
includes the SEC practice section (SECPS)
and the section’s public oversight board
(POB).
Public Regulation and
Self-Regulation

However similar their goals, public regulation
and self-regulation have important differ
ences, not all of which are immediately appar
ent. Public regulation is conducted with the
full power of the state in support of estab
lished requirements. Self-regulation has no
equivalent authority. At most, it can exclude
noncomplying members from whatever bene
fits group membership confers or impose
whatever sanctions members have voluntarily
agreed to accept. Such powers as the ability to
subpoena records and witnesses are not avail
able in self-regulation.
Public regulation is likely to emphasize
punishment for transgressions; self-regulation
2Ibid., p.68.
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sponsive to the wants of those who use the
service than any other form of regulation can
be.

will more likely emphasize remedies and the
avoidance of future deficiencies. There are
reasons for this. Public regulation is common
ly employed only when the community has
become aroused by what it considers improp
er conduct. The public wants that conduct
stopped and finds punishment a useful deter
rent. Self-regulation, however, often has a
strong concern for equity to members of the
group, which must somehow be balanced
with service to the community. Members of
the group and the community are both served
more effectively by remedy than by punish
ment.
Self-regulatory processes accept the need
for punishment in egregious cases, but sanc
tions are likely to have a positive purpose—to
be aimed at improved service to society along
with equitable treatment of the regulated.
Public regulation tends to view infractions as
willful violations deserving punishment. Self
regulation is concerned with establishing stan
dards for proper conduct and eliminating the
causes of unintentional and perhaps unrecog
nized failings as well as the rare refusal to
meet professional standards.
Finally, public regulation offers opportuni
ties not available to those engaged in self
regulation. Many a successful political career
has been founded on the publicity and acclaim
accorded a vigorous and resourceful prosecu
tor. Protecting the public, putting the rascals
away and battling the wrongdoers earns rec
ognition, gratitude and higher public office.
There is no equivalent opportunity or reward
in self-regulation.
Self-regulation, if it is justified at all, must
rest on something more than the self-interest
of those regulated. Generally, self-regulation
is perceived as more equitable than public reg
ulation because the standards to be met are
established and enforced by fellow practition
ers whose experience provides an understand
ing of the environment, the risks, the pres
sures and the possibilities of service that
laymen neither comprehend nor understand.
Self-regulation, if performed properly, also
assures better service to the public because its
emphasis is on remedy and improvement and
because it is in closer touch with practice,
more aware of changing needs, and more re

Self-Regulation’s Challenge

With this as backgound, let’s consider the
problems faced in the establishment and
maintenance of any system of self-regulation.
A major task of those involved in the process
is one of establishing mutual trust. Many
members of the regulated group accept self
regulation with considerable reservation, and
then they accept it only because they consider
it less undesirable than the public alternatives.
Few people seek regulation for its own sake.
Professionals seem to find any regulation par
ticularly irksome, a slight to their profession
alism and a potential threat should it get out of
control.
Those who represent the public and have its
best interests at heart are concerned that en
trusting regulation to members of the profes
sion is risky at best. They fear that self-inter
est and pressure from colleagues will
discourage the establishment and mainte
nance of adequate standards. In addition,
within the profession there will always be
some who disagree with the self-regulatory
process, no matter how it is conducted, and
either refuse to cooperate or vigorously op
pose what the majority of the group has ac
cepted. These disparate views must somehow
be brought together sufficiently to permit the
program to function.
Another difficulty is found in reforming the
erroneous expectations entertained by some
who confuse self-regulation with public regu
lation. Those who have the point of view of
public regulation expect a visibly impressive
level of activity. They want unequivocal evi
dence that the process is working effectively.
Without that evidence, they contend the pro
cess lacks credibility. In their minds, public
regulation is the model, and unless self-regu
lation emulates that model it isn’t as effective
as they believe it should be. When their ex
pectations aren’t met, they become critics of
the self-regulatory process.
At the other extreme are the expectations of
the group subject to self-regulation. Within
that group will be some—often too many—
who really expect no change from their pre
viously unregulated condition. They deny any
need for regulation and, at least in their own
minds, contest the right of anyone, even their
professional colleagues, to impose require
ments on them. Others will accept regulation
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but only in those few cases in which there is
great public interest that demands action if the
profession is to avoid severe censure. To
them, self-regulation means minimum inter
ference with the status quo. Obviously, the
expectations of all these interests cannot be
met.
Finally, and because of these disparate
views, there is the very real problem of main
taining satisfactory relationships between
those engaged in self-regulation and those
who have been entrusted with an oversight
responsibility and would likely be charged
with public regulation should the self-regula-

“The SEC, charged by Congress with
an oversight responsibility, interacts
with the section's self-regulatory
effort in a number of ways.”
tory process not succeed. If the latter do not
perform their oversight responsibility, they
fail their own assignments. If they perform
that oversight with excessive zeal, self-regu
lation is co-opted and becomes public regula
tion.
Progress of the SECPS

Where is the profession now, insofar as the
self-regulatory program for the SECPS is con
cerned? In a relatively short period of time,
the section has made remarkable strides. It has
adopted an impressive set of quality control
standards and other requirements to be met by
all members. A program of peer reviews has
been established, reviewers have been
trained, reporting mechanisms have been de
veloped and a procedure by the peer review
committee to evaluate the performance of
completed peer reviews is in place and func
tioning. (This applies to the private compa
nies practice section (PCPS) as well, although
the PCPS is beyond the scope of this article.)
Recognizing that peer reviews, like audits,
must be performed on a sampling basis, a
special investigations committee (SIC) has
been added to the SECPS to inquire into al
leged audit failures charged by plaintiffs in
litigation against any member firm. Such in
quiries are designed to be no more burden
some on the member firm than necessary, but
if circumstances suggest that there may be a
need for important remedial measures investi
gation of part or even all of the subject firm’s
practice is likely to follow. In addition, at the
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completion of the investigation, a recommen
dation of sanctions, if considered necessary,
will be made to the section’s executive com
mittee.
The SEC, charged by Congress with an
oversight responsibility, interacts with the
section’s self-regulatory effort in a number of
ways. It discharges its assigned responsibility
in part by becoming familiar with and testing
the work of the peer review committee, which
constitutes the cornerstone of the self-regula
tory program. It also seeks assurance that the
SIC is performing satisfactorily and that the
POB’s oversight function is effective. To
date, there has been no action on the part of
the SEC that can be construed as a serious
threat to the “ self’’ designation of the sec
tion’s regulatory process. At the same time, I
must report no lack of interest or failure of
diligence in the performance of the SEC’s
oversight function.
The POB’s Role

The POB, four of whose five members aren’t
accountants, occupies an interesting position
in the total scheme, a position with multiple
responsibilities. It represents the public,
meeting with various elements of the seif-reg
ulatory program on a recurring basis to remind
them of the public interest and the public
viewpoint.
The POB has no line authority and desires
none. From the beginning, it has taken the
position that, if the process is to be one of self
regulation, all authority must be vested in
members of the section. The POB can over
see, comment, suggest and point out; it cannot
order or demand. The POB sees as its purpose
the protection of the section’s right to self
regulation. It can achieve that purpose most
effectively by reminding the SECPS execu
tive committee of how its decisions may be
viewed by the public. Here’s an example.
There is an understandable tendency on the
part of member firms to object to any sugges
tion that technical membership rules be disre
garded. They are quite within their legal rights
in doing so. Some rules were specifically in
tended to limit the scope of members’ respon
sibility, for example, a cut-off date before
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which the SIC wouldn’t be concerned with
cases in litigation. The POB recognizes this
but on at least one occasion recommended a
contrary point of view. Relying on technical
rules, however legal, to avoid inquiries into
alleged audit failures may be regarded by the
public as contrary to the spirit of self-regula
tion. If there has been an audit failure, the
section needs to know what it is, assess its
implications for future service and assure that
any necessary remedial action is taken.
Furthermore, the public is unlikely to favor
technicalities that appear to protect substan
dard practice at the expense of investors. The

leging accounting or audit failures. Why do
these occur if peer review is effective?
There is no question in my mind that peer
review is effective in improving the general
quality of audits performed by firms subject to
it. The FOB receives and reads copies of all
adverse and qualified opinions resulting from
peer reviews; we sit in on some exit confer
ences; our staff reports to the board on letters
of comment to the managements of reviewed
firms and on such managements’ responses to
those comments. We observe in the peer re
view process an effectual and efficient combi
nation of professional challenges and re
sponse, both in the performance of the review
and in the reaction to it. Those cynics who see
it as an exercise in mutual backscratching
have no understanding of the effect of peer
criticism on proud and sensitive professionals
in a highly competitive activity.
If peer review is working so well, why is
there so much litigation? The peer review pro
cess is systems oriented. It is directed at the
reviewed firm’s system of quality control.
Litigation concerns specific cases. No system
can assure that work performed by mortals
will always be completely free of fault. Given
the total number of audits required and the
variety of conditions, distractions, pressures
and personal problems faced by the auditors
involved, some mistakes, lapses of judgment,
oversights and misunderstandings are as in
evitable as death and taxes. Perfect audits in
all circumstances and situations are as unlike
ly as sustained perfection in any other human
activity.

.". peer review is effective
in improving the general quality of audits
performed by firms subject to it."
public isn’t likely to be mollified with the
statement, “ Technically, the case can’t be in
quired into.’’ It asks, “ Do the facts in any
way imply that current standards of audit per
formance are not being met?’’ and “ Are the
rules intended to protect the public or to aid
firms in evading standards?’’ The POB serves
the cause of self-regulation by pointing out the
reasoning the public will apply.
The FOB staff serves as a reviewer of peer
review workpapers and the peer review pro
cess in general. The FOB also serves as a
buffer and provides liaison between the SEC
and the section’s regulatory activities. In do
ing so, it must be able to understand and em
pathize with both but sympathize with nei
ther. On some matters the views of these two
parties are remarkably similar; on other mat
ters they differ widely. The FOB strives to
explain each to the other and to seek a work
ing reconciliation wherever possible.

Poes the Profession Need an SIC?

Allegations of audit failure sufficient to initi
ate litigation against accountants may imply a
weakness in a firm’s system of quality con
trol. The fact that they may imply such a
weakness requires attention. The SIC is
charged with the responsibility of ascertaining
the probability of substance in such charges.
A preliminary review is made of the allega
tions and the financial statements in question
to discover whether the charges have any ap
parent foundation in fact. In some instances,
this is enough to establish that they are
groundless and the case can be closed. In oth
er cases, the preliminary review finds enough
in the allegations to warrant a discussion with
the firm’s representatives and a review of re
cent peer review findings. In some instances,
the circumstances are such that the SIC must

How Good Is Peer Review?

Two questions have been asked often enough
that they deserve comment:
1 Is peer review working?
2 As long as the profession has peer review,
why does it need the SIC?
The two are closely linked. The first ques
tion is raised most frequently on the basis of
reports of litigation in the financial press al
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servation. All have carried important execu
tive responsibilities; they are seasoned by
long experience. They possess excellent per
sonal reputations for integrity, dependability
and diligence, reputations that they are un
willing to see sullied in any way. They are
prudent, courageous, understanding and in
tent on getting the facts. They have high stan
dards of professional and public responsibil
ity, are aware of the pressures and temptations
that beset mortal man and on occasion exhibit
a strong sense of moral outrage. None of them
is seeking to build a new reputation; their am
bitions have been fulfilled. They can be trust
ed to take their public responsibilities serious
ly and to discharge them objectively.
At the AICPA’s ninth national conference
on current SEC developments in 1982, mem
bers of the POB were criticized as not being
" movers and shakers.” I expect that this is a
fair description of their present activities,

conclude that there is a possibility that a fail
ure in the firm’s system of quality control
occurred and that it could happen again.
If so, an investigation is undertaken. The
purpose of the investigation is to protect the
public, not to try the case. The specific case is
already in litigation; the court will determine
the validity of the plaintiff's allegations. But
the court will go no further. It is incumbent on
the self-regulatory process to protect the pub
lic against quality control breakdowns. If, and
I emphasize the word if, the firm’s quality
control process has failed in a specific case,
the process may also have failed in other au
dits involving clients in the same industry or
performed by the same personnel. A credible
self-regulatory program must ascertain whether
this is the fact and, if it is, take steps to see that
the deficiency in the firm’s system is remedied.
When the implications of an alleged audit
failure are deemed sufficient to threaten the
public interest, the SIC investigates the firm’s
system of quality control in terms much more
specific than contemplated in recurring peer
review. Peer review remains the cornerstone
of the section’s self-regulatory process. Yet,
no matter how effective peer review is, there
will always be instances of alleged audit fail
ure, and all of these raise questions about the
firm’s quality controls. The SECPS needs the
SIC to ascertain whether the potential for
harm to the public exists and to demand reme
dial measures, if needed.

“Those who are now engaged in any way
within th e . . . self-regulatory process
are seriously endeavoring to improve
the quality of professional
practice without placing undue
burdens on anyone."
however vigorous their earlier careers may
have been. I do not view such a description as
pejorative in any sense, although it may have
been so intended. My experience with movers
and shakers is that they often leave a mess for
someone else to clean up. Intent on fame and
glory, they stride through life straightening
out the affairs of lesser men whether dr not
such attention is needed. It is a good thing that
some movers and shakers are part of the ac
counting profession. It is also a good thing
that they aren’t members of the POB or the
SIC. One quakes at the mere thought of what a
first-class mover and shaker could do in such a
position.

A Learning Experience

For all concerned, this is a learning experi
ence, an interesting, exciting and difficult ex
perience. Many of the things are being done
for the first time, not only by those doing them
but the first time for the profession. Unavoid
ably that means there will be some unhappy
people. No one wants to be investigated or
sanctioned. Neither does anyone in the pro
cess want to make the mistake of charging
dereliction of duty without adequate support
for the charge.
An interesting question has been raised
about the type of people who should be ap
pointed to the POB and to the SIC. Let me
describe the current members of these units as
I have come to know them through direct ob

Some Future Prospects

So I would offer some suggestions. To those
who criticize an apparent lack of exciting ac
tions, I note that they may continue to be
disappointed. The self-regulatory process
works most effectively when it is not in the
public press. Don’t expect it to emulate public
regulation; it should and does favor different
methods and different goals. It will always
favor investigations and sanctions directed at
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the improvement of audit service over those
directed at mere punishment.
To those who object to the current selfregulatory process as too onerous, one can
only assert that self-regulation is, in fact, reg
ulation. Society expects more and more each
year from those who have the good fortune to
be regarded and rewarded as professionals.
Those who are now engaged in any way with
in the accounting profession’s sel- regulatory
process are seriously endeavoring to improve
the quality of professional practice without
placing undue burdens on anyone. They ap
preciate, enjoy and take pride in the quality of
their real world practice. Those who fail to
meet satisfactory standards in their profes
sional work will not be permitted to give the
entire SECPS a bad reputation or to expose the
self-regulatory process to undesirable risk.
I can also offer some assurances. Recon
ciliation of opposing influences within the

section, and between the section and govern
ment, is no easy matter. Yet, it is progressing.
Peer review and special investigations are
proceeding. Liaison with the SEC is effective.
The POB adds an essential public point of
view, does not hesitate to make its views
known and has been effective in causing re
consideration of decisions. Much has been
done and there is much yet to do. All engaged
in this effort are entitled to take some pride in
current accomplishments as long as they do
not rest on that record. The real record of self
regulation for accounting is yet to be made as
the profession works its way through this peri
od of economic stress and strain. The hard
decisions are yet to come. ■
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SEC PRACTICE SECTION
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
Firm Affiliation

Representative

Ray J. Groves, Chairman

*Ernst

Whinney

George L. Bernstein

*Laventhol & Horwath
A. M. Pullen & Company

T. Frank Booth
Robert M. Coffman

*Fox & Company

J. Michael Cook

*Deloitte Haskins & Sells

Mario J. Formichella

*Arthur Young

Howard Groveman

*Alexander Grant & Company

William D. Hall

*Arthur Andersen & Co.
Pannell Kerr Forster

Charles Kaiser, Jr.

*Coopers & Lybrand

William B. Keast

Keller, Zanger & Company

Charles E. Keller, III

*Seidman & Seidman

Bernard Z. Lee
J. Curt Mingle

Clifton Gunderson & Co.

J. David Moxley

*Touche Ross & Co.

Richard W. Paddock

Battelle & Battelle

Donald R. Sloan

*Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

John A. Thompson

*Main Hurdman

Jack C. Wahlig

*McGladrey, Hendrickson & Co.

Michael A. Walker

Mann Judd Landau

John W. Zick

*Price Waterhouse

Donald P. Zima

May Zima & Co.

* Firm entitled to permanent seat because firm audits 30 or more registrants under Section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

-

42

-

Exhibit VI
Page 2 o f 2

PEER REVIEW COMMITTEE
M ember

Firm Affiliation

Joseph X. Loftus, Chairman

Price Waterhouse

John F. Barna

Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

Clark C. Burritt

A. M. Pullen & Company

Paul B. Clark, Jr.

Main Hurdman

Robert W. Egner

Coopers & Lybrand

Arthur I. Farber

Altschuler, Melvoin & Glasser

Marvin Feller

Ernst & Whinney

Robert E. Fleming

Fleming, Tempas & Co.

John G. F. Knight

Purvis, Gray and Company

Daniel J. Moylan

Deloitte Haskins & Sells

Edward J. O’Grady

Laventhol & Horwath

Joseph A. Puglisi

Touche Ross & Co.

Robert H. Temkin

Arthur Young

Frank H. Whitehand

Arthur Andersen & Co.

Jerry E. Whitehorn

Whitehorn, Bradsher & Tankersley

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE
M ember

Firm Affiliation

Robert A. Mellin, Chairman

Hood and Strong

Mark J. Ferngold

Laventhol & Horwath

*Edwin P. Fisher

Arthur Andersen & Co.

*Thomas B. Hogan

Deloitte Haskins & Sells

Harry L. Laing

A. M. Pullen & Company

*Leroy Layton

Main Hurdman

*John B. O’Hara
*Leon P. Otkiss

Price Waterhouse
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.

*David Wentworth

McGladrey, Hendrickson & Co.

Retired
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